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MOORE AND CALLAHAN'S "LAW AND
LEARNING THEORY": A PSYCHOLOGIST'S
IMPRESSIONS*
By CLARK L. HULL f
THE primary objective of the founders of the Institute of Human
Relations was to contribute to an integrated development of the biological
and social sciences. Such a program necessarily includes in its scope the
broad fields of individual and social behavior. Portions of these two
major fields are conceived to combine with each other and with portions
of other basic sciences to form special disciplines which constitute im-
portant fields of practical interest. Prominent among these disciplines
are jurisprudence, political science, economics, sociology, cultural anthro-
pology, penology, psychiatry, and education. The Institute has fostered
a number of investigations in the field of jurisprudence. To this series
the Moore and Callahan study is a contribution of special significance.
In the early days of the Institute of Human Relations it became pain-
fully evident that isolated studies in the various social sciences did not
constitute a scientific integration. It must be remembered in this connec-
tion that an integrated approach to the social sciences as a whole had never
before been attempted. After considerable fumbling, a formal resolution
of this critical problem was found in a systematic theory of behavior com-
prehensive enough to furnish an integrative matrix for all of the social
sciences. This discovery also furnished a happy solution to the adminis-
trative dilemma of how to secure an integration of the work of numerous
investigators and yet, retain the freedom of all; for without the latter,
vital scientific research cannot be carried on.
The difficulties encountered in applying this administrative principle
have been great. For example, despite the fact that our knowledge con-
cerning behavior was considerable, it was fragmentary, and had never
been comprehensively formulated as a systematic set of principles. More-
over, if and when such a comprehensive set of principles should be formu-
lated, a second formidable difficulty would be encountered at the higher
levels of application because no scientist could be found who would be
competent in both the basic and the applied discipline, or who, being com-
petent in one, would be willing or able to acquire a working knowledge
of the other. The magnitude of this difficulty may be realized when it is
recalled that to become a master of even one field of the social sciences
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takes the better part of a lifetime. In the Moore-Callahan study this type
of obstacle has been largely surmounted. This means that in the present
state of our ignorance concerning ultimate behavioral laws, such a work
as the one here under consideration must be somewhat in the nature of a
courageous tour de force, and, as such, must be expected to display char-
acteristic defects. For exactly the same reason, also, it is probable that
no man now living is competent adequately to judge its ultimate merits
and defects. The reviewer trusts that the following comments will be
read with this obvious limitation constantly in mind.'
At the outset one or two unimportant defects may be mentioned. There
are a few misprints, such as the form of two equations which appear on
page 28. In each of these the negative exponent of 10 is placed nearly on a
level with the 10 itself; the context, however, is such that any reader who
would care to use the equations would hardly be misled. Another trivial
defect of a quite different type is found in Figure 13; here, apparently,
all of the points plotted are placed ten units below where they should be
with respect to the scale at the left. But this also is not likely to mislead,
since the tabular values from which the figure is plotted are given clearly
in the columns marked "C" of Table 3, pages 100-02.
Turning to the statistical treatment of the empirical results arising
from the several studies reported in the monograph, we find much which
is admirable. It is evident that the data have been tabulated with great
care and that much thought has been lavished on their analysis. More-
over, the method of fitting objective equations to the various functions
emerging from the empirical evidence is strongly to be commended. The
meticulous care with which control observations were made before the
introduction of the causal factor in each study renders the statistical
analysis fruitful in significant dynamic relationships.
The simplest and most easily interpreted of the studies is that which
concerns a rotary traffic arrangement at a complex street intersection. -
It was found that signs commanding drivers to keep to the right of an
oval painted on the pavement were obeyed to a considerable extent, and
that the extent to which obedience was observed approached quite closely
an inverse linear function' of the extent of the required deviation from
the normal path (shortest distance) across the intersection. This, as
the writers point out,4 is in complete conformity with theoretical behavior
1. The reviewer's only technical knowledge of the law was obtained many years ago
from a college course in Constitutional Law and a summer's undirected study of Cooley's
BLACxSTONE. He has, however, had the advantage of repeated conversations with Pro-
fessor Moore during the progress of the investigation here being reviewed, particularly
during the period when the data were being analyzed.
2. Pp. 53-60.




expectation that organisnis will take the shortest practicable path to their
goal or point of reinforcement. On the basis of behavior principles it is
also to be expected that the effect of a printed imperative will be greater
upon certain drivers than upon others, depending on how much anxiety
(secondary motivation) is aroused as determined by variable individual
constitution and life history. Thus there is a variable conflict or com-
petition between (1) the motivation which leads to the attainment of the
original goal as soon and as economically as possible and (2) the motiva-
tion produced by the anxiety.
Moreover, it is to be presumed that in any individual the greater the
conformity to the command of the sign, the less will be the amount of
anxiety. In the rotary traffic situation there lie two lateral motivational
gradients: (1) a major positive goal gradient, its maximum lying along a
straight line from one street to another and diminishing in each direction,
and (2) an anxiety gradient produced by the sign. This negative or avoid-
ance gradient presumably has its maximum at the oval and decreases
toward a point of minimum anxiety some place at the right." Clearly,
the driver's course across this intersection will fall at the locus of the
series of points at which the difference between these two opposed gradi-
ents has the largest positive value. This point of maximum positive value
will vary from driver to driver, depending upon the relative strengths of
the two motivations. If one driver has a strong motivation to reach his
destination and a relatively weak potential anxiety from the disregard of
the police sign, his path across the intersection will be comparatively
little diverted from a straight line. On the other hand, a driver who
happens to be in no great haste, or who is especially subject to anxiety
from yiolating police signs, may drive far out in complete conformity to
the command of the sign. The results shown in Moore and Callahan's
table 6 represent a composite of the relative strengths of positive and
negative motivations in a fairly random sample of the driving population
of New Haven.
A somewhat less simple investigation was that concerned with the effect
on drivers of tagging cars which remained parked for various intervals
beyond the time specified as the limit by the city ordinances, as indicated
by permanently placed street signs. Statistical problems of some com-
plexity arose as to the proper interpretation of the data secured, owing in
part to the fact that any parking space left vacant by drivers whose cars
had been tagged would be occupied in more or less unknown amounts by
other drivers wandering around in search of a place to park who would not
5. Unfortunately we do not yet know very much about the exact characteristics of
either of these gradients. It is possible that a careful analysis of the data contained in
the table, p. 56, might throw considerable light on this important matter. That, how-
ever, extends beyond the range of the present review.
6. P. 56.
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have been able to park in the observed area had not the tagging occurred.
Despite these and other difficulties, the writers are probably justified in
their contention that the tagging of the cars had little influence on the be-
havior of any drivers except those of the cars actually tagged, and that
these latter drivers showed a marked tendency to avoid parking in this
area. This tendency is convincingly accounted for by Moore and Callahan
as resulting from the creation in the drivers whose cars were tagged of
a new and specific anxiety motivation.
We turn now to the more elaborate parking studies concerned with the
effects of posting signs designed to limit the duration of parking. In
experimental situations, it is customary to report the functional relation-
ships between the various quantitative effects observed and the quanti-
tative aspects of the cause introduced. For this reason one would naturally
expect to find an equation expressing the shift in parking times as a func-
tion of the times stated in the several city ordinances involved. The
reader is, accordingly, somewhat surprised to see that the major part of
the analysis is based, not directly upon the ordinance times of permissible
parkings (the causal factor introduced into the situation) but, rather,
upon certain internal relationships among the cumulative distribution of
parkings as influenced by ordinance times.
As a matter of fact, a study of various of the published tables 7 shows
that there is an indication of such an empirical relationship between the
introduced cause and the behavioral effects. From the data in question
the reviewer plotted a curve which reveals a tolerably regular functional
relationship (though somewhat less regular than the relationship plotted
by Moore and Callahan in their Figure 21 8) between ordinance time
and the mean time at which the distribution of parkings showed the first
indications of response to the posted equivalents of the ordinance; the
curve so plotted is fairly comparable, point for point, with the illuminating
graph shown in Figure 21. Roughly speaking, the two graphs present
the same picture. So far as one can tell from the limited number of points
on the newly plotted graph, the most probable relationship between ordi-
nance time and the time of the first indication of the parkers' response
to the posted statement of it is approximately linear, much as shown in
the published figure. By inspection, the equation of the reviewer's graph
representing the relationship between the two times is approximately,
t'= 2.3 t + I
where t is the permissible parking time in minutes according to the city
ordinance, and t is the parking duration in minutes at which the first
indication of response to the posted sign became evident in the cumulative
distributions of parking times. Thus t' is the duration corresponding to




Moore and Callahan's "Point," symbolized by them as p in units of the
cumulative percentage of the spontaneous or unregulated (control) series
of observations. The above equation means in effect that as a whole the
parkers did not begin to respond to the posted ordinance until a period
had elapsed which was, on the average, about 2.3 times the duration speci-
fied in the ordinance as the parking limit.
When one stops to consider this outcome, it is at first somewhat surpris-
ing for several reasons. True enough, as Moore and Callahan point out,"
there is known to be a relativity of time-interval judgments in the sense
that long intervals are less accurately judged than small ones. But at
this point a paradox enters. In the experiments by which was determined
the above-mentioned law of the relativity of time judgments, the sub-
jects making the experimental judgments had no access to time-pieces;
otherwise, the precision of time determinations would have been mainly
a function not of the time interval being measured, but of the accuracy
of the time-pieces consulted and of the precision of reading the time in-
dicated by the time-pieces. It is to be assumed, of course, that nearly all
of the drivers carried reasonably accurate time-pieces. In view of these
considerations we seem forced to the conclusion that the street signs as
stimuli did not evoke enough anxiety regarding possible enforcement of
the ordinance to cause the drivers to consult their watches. This, of course,
throws us back substantially to the relativity position taken by Moore
and Callahan.
Even so, there remains the question of why in all cases the errors in
time judgment should, upon the whole, have been so uniformly in one
direction, that is, in effect of judging the time parked as less than it was
in fact. It is difficult to believe that this is merely a phenomenon of rela-
tivity in time judgments. It seems much more likely that it is a reflection
of the habits of successful (and so, reinforced) disregard of law produced
by our characteristically lax customs of law enforcement. Nevertheless,
it is truly astonishing that that small per cent of the parking population
which is the most sensitive to anxiety from law violation should not have
responded to an unambiguous notice until more than twice the maximum
time stipulated by the ordinance had elapsed. It is difficult to believe that
a few of the more conscientious or timid individuals even in our blase
culture would not have consulted their watches and so have observed the
ordinance exactly. Accordingly, if sufficiently large samples of data were
to be secured and sufficiently delicate methods of detecting small effects
were to be employed, it is believed that the behavior of the individuals in
question would locate Moore and Callahan's "Point" (p) rather close to
the time specified in the ordinance. For example, on the basis of general
behavior principles it is to be expected that if really severe penalties for
9. Pp. 74 et seq.
[Vol. 53: 330
LAW AND LEARNING THEORY
violation of the ordinance were uniformly inflicted for all violations as
soon as they occurred, many drivers in their anxiety to avoid a possible
ordinance violation would make certainty doubly certain by reducing their
parking times to periods less than the ordinance time, in which case p
would stand at a value appreciably less than that of t.
There is some evidence of the correctness of the theoretical expecta-
tion just suggested, despite the fact that Moore and Callahan publish
graphs which they regard as showing that the percentage distribution of
the parkings for times less than those corresponding to their "Point" does
not differ in their "regulated" and "unregulated" distributions. A careful
examination of their published tables reveals some indications of such
a response as might reasonably be expected on the part of very conscien-
tious or timid drivers. A rough measure of change in a distribution as
a whole lies in the shift of the mode or point of greatest frequency in
the distribution, frequency categories remaining constant. In a study of
the tables of Appendix B,1" a definite suggestion of such a shift was
found. Of these ten tables, a shift such as is to be expected occurs in
seven; in two there is no shift; and in one there is a shift, but it is in the
opposite direction. The facts are summarized briefly in the following
table:
Time intervml of parking fre-
Parking study Ordinance parking quency ina=num Agreement uith
number thme limit Before posting After posting expectation
of Sigi of sign
L 2 2-3 minutes 0-1 minutes +
IL 2 1-2 minutes 0-1 minutes +
11. 2 1-2 minutes 0-1 minutes +
IV. 2 4-5 minutes 2-3 minutes +
V. 15 5-6 minutes 34 minutes +
V1. 15 2-3 minutes 1-2 minutes +
VIL 30 3-4 minutes 2-3 minutes +
VIII. 30 4-5 minutes 3-4,5-6 minutes ?
IX. 60 1-2 minutes 1-2 minutes ?
X. 60 8-9 minutes 11-12 minutes I _ _
The theoretical expectation is still further confirmed by the distribution
of the ordinance times of the studies in question; without exception the
modal shifts in the direction of a shorter time fall in the studies involving
the shorter ordinance times, the breakdown of the rule occurring only in
the studies involving the longer ordinance times. It is possible that such
a small effect originating at a time so remote from that of the mode would
be dissipated before its influence could spread so far.
In this connection there remains a tantalizing question. One wonders
why, if the parkers took a chance on such an extensive violation of the




there is clear evidence that they really were influenced. This paradox
may be accounted for by the general practice in the American culture for
the authorities practically to wink at small violations, but to punish gross
violations with increasing certainty and severity.
In general summary of the empirical aspects of the monograph, it may
be said that the Moore-Callahan investigation was the logical outcome of
a wholly naturalistic conception of the law, that it was planned and exe-
cuted with careful provision for control observations which would make
possible a determination of the effect on human behavior of certain legal
enactments and related administrative procedures, that the resulting data
were meticulously analyzed for effects of the impact of the several enact-
ments and administrative procedures, and, finally, that the results of this
analysis have been interpreted in terms of a general objective theory of
behavior. In view of the novelty of the undertaking it is not surprising
that difficulties were encountered; indeed, it is truly surprising that these
were as small as they actually proved to be. Of major significance in
this pioneering investigation is the fact that it has demonstrated that juris-
prudence has a legitimate place in a quantitative natural-science conception
of the social sciences. If one should be tempted to criticize the investi-
gation on the ground of the superficially commonplace or trivial nature of
the phenomena under observation, it is only necessary to recall that when
the action of natural law is the primary concern, nothing is trivial which
reveals unambiguously and quantitatively the results of its operation. The
rolling of marbles down an inclined plane or the falling of bricks from a
tower are trivial events in themselves, but when such events were carefully
measured by Galileo, they led not only to a discovery of the quantitative
laws of motion, but, ultimately, to a truly revolutionary change in man's
conception of the physical world. It is believed that the Moore-Callahan
investigation will find a permanent place in the literature of the present
scientific revolution in which the social (behavioral) sciences are gradually
taking on the characteristics of true natural science.
As a continuation of the same line of thought, we may consider briefly
the relationship and bearing of the Moore-Callahan investigation to the
philosophy of law. The reader may well have conjectured from the open-
ing paragraphs of the present series of comments that there is implicit
in the program of the Institute of Human Relations a very definite philos-
ophy which naturally extends to what is known as a philosophy of law.
Very briefly, this is the basic hypothesis that there are ultimate laws to
which all mammalian behavior conforms, that these laws may be discov-
ered and formulated quantitatively as equations, and that the forms of
these equations are the same for all individuals and species, the differ-
ences lying only in certain quantitative constants (coefficients, exponents,
etc.) which appear in the equations. Such assumptions have long been
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commonplace in the natural sciences, but they are not yet fully recognized
in the social sciences in general and in the law in particular. Thus law is
conceived as a special form of human engineering in which the science of
behavior plays the role which physics plays in ordinary engineering, and
in which statutes are regarded as verbal or symbolic inventions designed
to mediate certain behavioral ends, much as mechanical, chemical, or elec-
trical inventions are designed to attain certain physical ends. Just as many
successful physical inventions were achieved before the discovery of the
ultimate physical principles upon which their operation depends, so, many
successful laws have been, and will continue to be, enacted in the absence
of any formalized knowledge of the elementary behavior principles upon
which their success depends.
Professor Moore has given a vigorous statement of this philosophy
in his contribution to an important symposium on legal philosophy,"
where he elaborates the natural-science approach in a sophisticated man-
ner. It is encouraging to note that with few exceptions the writers rep-
resented in that work are in general harmony with Professor loore's
views, only one being definitely antagonistic. The monograph before us
is an original, fearless, and convincing exemplification of the implemen-
tation of this philosophy.
11. See article by Ioore and Callahan in MY PHILOSOPHY OP LAW (1941) 201.
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